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rules for the dynamics of the economy. The experiments carried out
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is linked to the systematic behaviour of the monetary authority. The
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both at the union level and at the country level, namely to explain
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
According to the Treaty Establishing the European Community, the primary
objective of the ECB is to maintain price stability. Eventually, monetary
policy is permitted to stimulate growth of the diﬀerent regions, as long as
it does not jeopardize the goal of price stability. Moreover, the Governing
Council of the ECB has speci￿ed a quantitative de￿nition of the maintenance
of price stability, formulated in terms of the euro area HICP, which is a
weighted average of the EMU countries￿ HICP. The weight of each country
corresponds to its share in total consumption in the EMU. So, the ECB has
adopted an euro-area wide perspective in the conduct of monetary policy,
clarifying that it would not react to regional or national developments.
Taking this framework as the starting point in our analysis, we investi-
gate the importance of the behaviour of the monetary authority in a currency
union where cross-country asymmetries are not necessarily re￿ected in dif-
ferences in economic size. We consider rules in which the monetary authority
sets the interest rate as a function of current in￿ation and output and the
lagged interest rate. There is a wide agreement that the choice on how to
conduct monetary policy has important consequences for the dynamics of
an economy. Indeed, as pointed out by Dotsey (1999a, b) and Woodford
(2003), the way the monetary authority reacts to economic activity has sig-
ni￿cant implications for the way a model economy responds to shocks. We
inspect the implications of alternative policy rules for the economic dynam-
ics of a currency union, therefore extending to a monetary union framework
previous work on this subject.
The analysis of monetary policy when the policy instrument is the inter-
est rate has received considerable attention in the literature, namely follow-
ing the seminal paper of Taylor (1993). A number of prominent examples
are included in the volume of Taylor (1999), e.g. Batini and Haldane (1999),
McCallum and Nelson (1999) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1999). These
papers look at the welfare eﬀects and the variability of output and in￿ation
induced by alternative policy rules. A diﬀerent approach to the analysis
of interest rate rules is taken by Dotsey (1999a, b), McCallum (1999) and
Christiano and Gust (1999), who examine the implications of changing the
feedback parameters in the monetary policy rule on the responses of a model
economy to shocks and the feasibility of parameter choice as to the deter-
minacy, indeterminacy or explosiveness for the economy responses.
Our work is in the spirit of the latter mentioned strand of the litera-
ture, speci￿cally we address issues regarding the implications of systematic
monetary policy for the dynamics of an economy. While these papers deal
2with single economy models, we study the consequences of alternative policy
rules in a two-country monetary union, both in terms of aggregate variables
and individual country variables. Albeit the mainly positive focus of our
analysis, we also look at the impact of alternative policy rules on welfare
related indicators, namely the volatility of in￿ation and output. In a context
similar to ours, Benigno (2003) ￿nds that HICP targeting policy as de￿ned
by the ECB would only be optimal in the case that the relative asymmetries
are well captured by diﬀerences in economic dimension. If the degree of price
stickiness is diﬀerent across countries, a (nearly) optimal policy gives higher
weight to developments in the country where prices are stickier. This con-
clusion is in line with previous ￿ndings by Aoki (2001), that in an economy
with a ￿exible price sector and a ￿xed price sector optimal policy involves
targeting in￿ation in the sticky-price sector rather than a broad measure of
in￿ation.
We construct a stylised two-country general equilibrium monetary model,
buﬀeted by monetary and technology shocks, to serve as laboratory for
studying the operating characteristics of Taylor-type interest rate rules.
Following a considerable part of the literature over the last two decades,
we assume the existence of price stickiness in order to get less trivial real
eﬀects from monetary policy in the short run, meaning that even though
￿rms choose prices optimally they cannot reset their prices every period in
response to shocks that hit the economy. We model price stickiness by con-
sidering that prices are subject to changes at random intervals, as in Calvo
(1983)1. Both Gal￿, Gertler and L￿pez-Salido (2001, 2003) using a single
equation estimation procedure and Smets and Wouters (2003) based on the
estimation of a dynamic general equilibrium model ￿nd evidence in favour
of a signi￿cant degree of price stickiness in the euro area. Micro evidence on
the degree of price stickiness for individual euro area countries is somewhat
scarce and the extent to which cross-country comparisons are hampered by
methodological diﬀerences is not clear. Even so, focusing on some studies
with similar characteristics (based on information for consumer prices), a
somewhat higher degree of price stickiness was found by Aucremanne and
Dhyne (2004) for Belgium (roughly one year) compared with the results of
Baudry et al. (2004) for France (around 6 months) and Dias, Dias and Neves
(2004) for Portugal (8.5 months)2.
1This approach to model the dynamics of price adjustment is widely used in the lit-
erature. King and Watson (1996) and Yun (1996) were among the ￿rst to use the Calvo
formulation.
2These results show a somewhat longer duration than that found by Bils and Klenow
(2002) for the US, namely around 4 months. The ￿nding that rigidity in European coun-
3A sticky-price model will not replicate all the main features of real world
data, as extensively shown by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000)3. Actu-
ally, King and Watson (1996) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997)
conclude that neither a sticky-price model nor a model incorporating only a
￿nancial market friction accounts for the main stylised facts in the data. In
a recent paper, Papadopoulou (2002) combines sticky prices with a ￿nancial
market friction into a dynamic general equilibrium model and ￿nds that the
uni￿ed model performs better than either one of the models including only
a single friction. Consequently, several authors have argued that the empir-
ical ￿tting of a model is improved by combining more than one source of
frictions and a number of recent papers tried to ascertain the set of frictions
that make a model ￿t best the empirical evidence. The models of Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2003) for the US economy and Smets and
Wouters (2003) for the euro area include a considerable set of nominal and
real rigidities because this allows to better replicate the main characteristics
of the monetary transmission mechanism.
Given that our analysis is focused on the implications of alternative
monetary policy rules in a currency union, we abstract from many features
that would approximate the model to the real world, namely we keep a single
rigidity in the model. Nevertheless, we do not expect signi￿cant changes in
major conclusions of the present paper.
The experiments we carry out show, in general, that the way shocks
propagate in the monetary union is linked to the systematic behaviour of the
monetary authority. Our key ￿ndings are as follows. As previously pointed
out in the literature, the design of monetary policy plays an important role
in the dynamics of an economy. We extend earlier work to a monetary
union framework with asymmetric countries. In this context we ￿nd that
the way the central bank reacts is important both at the union level and
at the country level, namely to explain diﬀerences in economic behaviour
that arise between countries in the union. On the other hand, in our model
the policy that stabilizes in￿ation is not necessarily the same that makes
output in the union less volatile. Also, the policy that provides greater
tries is higher than that in the US is consistent with the ￿ndings of Gal￿, Gertler and
L￿pez-Salido (2001, 2003) for the euro area as a whole compared to the US.
3A frequent approach in the literature has been to introduce sticky wages as an al-
ternative or a complement to sticky prices (see for example Erceg, Henderson and Levin
(2000)). Even though some authors have suggested that introducing wage staggering in-
creases the ability of a model to generate persistent real responses to monetary shocks,
Edge (2002) demonstrates that a staggered price model can generate equally persistent
responses if one assumes ￿rm-speci￿c factor inputs.
4stabilization in aggregate terms does not necessarily imply the same for
each country individually.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the general equilib-
rium model used. Section 3 brie￿y discusses the parametrisation. In section
4 we obtain the linearised equilibrium conditions. Section 5 investigates the
mechanics of the model, assuming both countries are identical. Section 6
analyses the implications of alternative monetary policy rules in a monetary
union comprising two identical countries. Section 7 discusses how alterna-
tive policy rules aﬀect the behaviour of member countries in the monetary
union in the presence of cross-country asymmetries in the degree of price
rigidity. Section 8 concludes.
2 The model
We use a two-country monetary model featuring only one type of friction,
namely sticky-prices, and where capital is in ￿xed supply. The model extends
the sticky-price framework in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997) to
a two-country monetary union model. We change the way price-stickiness
is modeled by following Calvo (1983).
The monetary union consists of country A and country B and is popu-
lated by a continuum of agents in the interval [0,1]. We assume that the
population of segment [0,n] resides in country A while population of the
segment (n,1] resides in country B. A single monetary authority conducts
monetary policy in the union. Each country is populated by an in￿nitely
lived representative agent and a continuum of producers of diﬀerentiated
goods that are competitive monopolists. In addition, we assume complete
￿nancial market integration in the monetary union and therefore there exists
a single funds market in the union. Each household purchases goods, sup-
plies labour to the ￿rms, and makes deposits to the ￿nancial intermediary.
The ￿nancial intermediary receives deposits from households and lump-sum
injections of money from the monetary authority, and makes loans to ￿rms.
Firms need loans because they must pay workers before they sell their out-
put, and borrow these funds at the gross interest rate Rt.W ea s s u m et h a t
there is no mobility of labour between countries, therefore each ￿rm hires
domestic workers only.
2.1 Households
All households in the monetary union consume goods produced in both
countries. Let￿s consider the generic agent j,w h e r ej ∈ [0,n] if the agent
5resides in country A and j ∈ (n,1] if the agent resides in country B. Given
that we will not consider any heterogeneity among consumers we end up
having two types of consumers (A and B)4.
At time t each (representative) household ranks alternative streams of









where β is a discount factor, 0 <β<1, C
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t are units of consumption at
time t and N
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t is an index of consumption of commodity bundles produced in coun-

















At is the consumption bundle of the continuum of goods produced in
Aa n dC
j
Bt is the consumption bundle of the continuum of goods produced
in country B6. These bundles of the diﬀerentiated goods produced in each
country (indexed by a if produced in country A and by b if produced in
country B) are de￿ned as constant elasticity of substitution aggregators


















4All households within each country are faced with an identical problem. Therefore we
can look at the decision problem of the representative household of each country.
5We can reconcile our model with balanced growth if we think of this utility function
as an indirect utility function for a household whose actual utility function depends on
market and non-market consumption and hours (on this issue see for example Greenwood,
Rogerson and Wright (1996)).
6Thus n is the size of country A both in terms of population and also in terms of the
share on total consumption of the consumption of the diﬀerentiated goods produced in
A. Similarly, 1 − n is the size of country B both in terms of population and the share in


















where σ>1 is the elasticity of substitution across the goods produced within
each country, while the elasticity of substitution between bundles CAt and
CBt is equal to one.
Given a decision on C
j










constraint given by the Cobb-Douglas consumption index (2). The demand

































Bt,h o u s e h o l dj allocates the ex-









under the constraints (3) and (4). The demand for diﬀerentiated consump-














































































The overall price index P
j
t ,d e ￿ned as the minimum expenditure in coun-









































t(b) are the prices, at time t, of the goods produced in
c o u n t r yAa n dB ,r e s p e c t i v e l y ,a n ds o l di nc o u n t r yj. Assuming that there
are no transportation costs, prices are set taking the monetary union as
a common market. It follows that pA
t (a)=pB
t (a)=pt(a) and pA
t (b)=
pB
t (b)=pt(b).T h e r e f o r e ,PA
At = PB
At = PAt and PA
Bt = PB
Bt = PBt.G i v e n
these assumptions and the symmetric structure of preferences the purchasing
power parity holds, i.e., PA
t = PB
t = Pt.
The representative household of country j supplies N
j
t units of labour
at the nominal wage rate W
j
t . Each household faces a cash-in-advance on
















t a r et i m ep e r i o dt wage earnings, which are paid to the house-
holds in time to satisfy its time t cash constraint, and D
j
t are deposits made





























t are the pro￿ts received from the ￿nancial intermediary8 and
DivF
j
t are the pro￿ts received from ￿rms. The representative household is
endowed with Kj units of capital that it supplies inelastically to a compet-
itive rental market. The rental rate of capital in each country is R
j
Kt.W e
assume there is no technology for capital accumulation and capital does not
depreciate. As a result the aggregate stock of capital is constant, and we
s e ti tt ou n i t y .






























































7We drop superscripts in the price indices as they are redundant.
8Since we assume ￿nancial markets are completely integrated, all agents own an equal
share in the capital of the ￿nancial intermediary and therefore receive an equal share of
its pro￿ts.







































At time t, monopolist competitive ￿rms in each country produce diﬀeren-







where yt(i) denotes the production of good i (where goods produced in A
are indexed by a and goods produced in B are indexed by b), ξ
j
t is a time-
varying exogenous technology shock in country j,a n dNt (i) is the domestic
labour employed by the ￿rm in the production of good i.
Firms rent homogeneous capital and labour in perfectly competitive fac-




t be the rental rate of capital and the wage
rate, respectively9. Workers must be paid in advance of production. Conse-
quently ￿rms have to borrow their wage bill from the ￿nancial intermediaries
at the beginning of period t. Repayment occurs at the end of period t,a tt h e
gross interest rate Rt.E c o n o m i cp r o ￿ts are distributed to the ￿rms owner
(the representative household in each country) at the beginning of period
t+1. The problem is completely symmetric between all ￿r m si ne a c hc o u n -









Kt as given, one can easily show that the capital
to labour ratio is constant across ￿rms and that marginal costs are the same


















9G i v e nt h a tn of a c t o ri sp r o d u c ts p e c i ￿c then national factor prices are unique.
9We consider that not all ￿rms are able to reoptimise in each period.
Speci￿cally, we use a discrete time version of Calvo (1983), by assuming
that in each period t a ￿rm faces a constant probability 1 − θj (j = A, B)
of being able to reoptimise nominal prices10 a n dw i t hp r o b a b i l i t yθj the
￿rm will keep its price constant11. This implies that the fraction of ￿rms
reoptimising its price at t is 1 − θj. The possibility of a ￿rm changing its
price is independent of history and we do not need to keep track of ￿rms
reoptimising. The expected time over which the price is not reoptimised,
i.e., the expected waiting time for the next reoptimisation, is therefore 1
1−θj
for each country j12.I ft h e￿rm reoptimises it will do so after the realization
of current period shocks13.
A central issue in Calvo-type price setting models is that when ￿rms
reoptimise they understand that they will not be able to do it in every
subsequent period. Therefore, taking ￿rst the case of country A, ￿rms that
reoptimise at time t choose p∗

















Pt+i+1 is the marginal value of a dollar to the representative
10The ability to reoptimize is independent across ￿rms and time. The opportunity to
reoptimize follows a Bernoulli distribution.
11Time-dependent models of the type we use, where the number of ￿rms changing prices
in any period is speci￿ed exogenously, are commonly used in the literature. As argued by
Woodford (2003), the exogenous nature of the probability of reoptimization can be ratio-
nalised by the existence of costs related to the decision making-process (as documented
by Zbaracki et al. (2000)). Even so, some authors argue that a more realistic model
should endogeneize the timing of price adjustments, as in Caplin and Leahey (1991), Dot-
sey, King and Wolman (1999), Burnstein (2002), and Golosov and Lucas (2003). These
state-dependent models assume ￿rms constantly re-evaluate their price by comparing the
bene￿ts and costs (the so-called menu-costs) of changing it. Nevertheless, time-dependent
models of the type we use and state-dependent models generate similar results in a mod-
erate in￿ation framework.
12The time that elapses between price adjustments follows a geometric distribution.
13The literature on staggered price-setting has also assumed that new prices are chosen
at a date before they ￿rst take eﬀect, e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2003), or
that pricing decisions are not always based on current information, as in Mankiw and Reis
(2002). Both interpretations imply that optimization is conditional on information avail-
able at an earlier date, and therefore a monetary policy shock will aﬀect prices with some
lag. Eichenbaum and Fisher (2003) ￿nd that, even though a model featuring only sticky-
prices does not ￿nd much support in US data, allowing for a lag between the time ￿rms
reoptimize and the time they implement such decisions (arguably one quarter) improves
the ￿t of the model. Nevertheless, we do not expect that it would mean fundamental
changes in our analysis, so we abstract from this fact.
10household in country A and is taken as exogenous by the ￿rm, and p∗
t(a)
is the optimal price chosen by a ￿rm that reoptimises at time t.S o t h e
















































































t(a) is set as a markup µ over a weighted average of marginal costs
expected to prevail in future dates at which p∗
t(a) applies15. The problem
for country B ￿r m si ss i m i l a r .
Because ￿rms reoptimising in each country face an identical problem
they will choose the same price, that is p∗
t(a) does not depend on good a
and p∗
t(b) does not depend on good b.T h o s e￿rms that do not reoptimise
keep their prices ￿xed. This fraction of prices charged in t is a subset of the
prices charged in t − 1, with each price showing up with the same relative
frequency in the price distribution in t and t − 1. Therefore, Calvo price-
setting implies the following state equations:
14The expectation is conditional on information through period t and taken over states
of nature in which the ￿rm cannot reoptimise. Therefore, the supplier of good a chooses
p
∗
t(a) on the basis of information available at date t,a st om a x i m i s ep r o ￿ts given the
expected state-contingent values of the random variables V
A
t , YAt, PAt and ξ
A
t .
15Recall that in the case of ￿exible prices, all ￿rms reoptimise each period and, as usual





t . Note that when σ gets close to one we















2.3 Financial intermediary and equilibrium in the loan mar-
ket
Financial markets are completely integrated in the monetary union. De-
mand in the loan market comes from ￿rms who need to ￿nance their wage
bill. Regarding the supply of loans, at the beginning of each period the per-
fectly competitive ￿nancial intermediary receives deposits from households
in both countries (Dt = nDA
t +( 1− n)DB
t ) plus a monetary injection from
the monetary authority (Xt). At the end of the period the ￿nancial inter-
mediary pays RtD
j
t to households in country j in return to their deposits
and distributes the pro￿ts from the monetary injection. Since we assume
that all agents own an equal share of the ￿nancial intermediary, they receive
an equal share of its pro￿ts16. In per capita terms Xt = XA
t = XB
t ,a n d
therefore the dividends received by each household are RtXt.C l e a r i n g i n
the loan market implies
nWA
t NA
t +( 1− n)WB
t NB
t = nDA
t +( 1− n)DB
t + Xt. (19)
2.4 Goods market equilibrium
Given that in the model the only source of demand for the goods produced in
the union is consumption by households17, equilibrium in the goods market
implies that overall consumption of each type of good equals its production:
ct (a)=yt (a) and ct (b)=yt (b).
Let CA
At and CB
At be the consumption of the bundle of goods produced
in A by the representative consumer of country A and of country B, respec-
tively, and similarly for the bundle of goods produced in B we have CA
Bt
and CB
Bt. Then total consumption in the monetary union of each bundle of
16Consequently each country will receive the pro￿ts of the ￿nancial intermediary in
proportion to its relative size in the union.
17We do not assume the possibility of having consumption by the Government. We only
assume the existence of a monetary authority, whose single role is to inject money into
the economy, which is channeled to the agents through the ￿nancial intermediary.
12goods is Cjt ≡ nCA
jt +( 1− n)CB
jt while total production is Yjt (j = A, B).
Consequently, equilibrium in the goods markets in aggregate terms implies
CAt = YAt and CBt = YBt.































































We assume that the monetary authority sets the interest rate according to
as p e c i ￿ed policy rule. The speci￿cation of the rule is known by agents. By
assuming that the monetary authority conducts rule-based policy we mean
that the central bank commits itself to a systematic way of determining
an appropriate response to economic developments, by acting in conformity
with a policy rule that it judges adequate at the time the decision is made.
We also postulate the existence of a random component in monetary policy.
Our analysis contributes to the debate on the implications of alternative
monetary policy rules. It has been common in the literature to describe
monetary policy by means of reaction functions that link the nominal short-
term interest rate to in￿ation and output. An early and in￿uential paper
was Taylor (1993), and a number of well-known contributions are collected
in Taylor (1999). We assume, following Clarida, Gal￿ and Gertler (1998),
that the central bank has a target for the (gross) nominal interest rate
in period t, denoted by R∗
t, which depends on the gaps between in￿ation
(Πt = Pt
Pt−1) and output (Y )and their steady-state values19.T oc a p t u r et h e
tendency of the central banks to smooth changes in interest rates and to
allow for some randomness in monetary policy, we assume that the actual




1−gr  rt. (22)
18The proof can be found for example in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2003).
19Given a variable Xt we denote by X its steady-state value.
13where  rt is an exogenous shock to the policy function and the target rate,
R∗











In equation (22) gr represents the degree of interest rate smoothing, that
is when gr 6=0the monetary authority partially adjusts the policy rate to
its target, eliminating only a fraction of the gap between the actual and
the target interest rate. Gradualism in monetary policy can result from the
fact that the central bank seeks to minimize the variability of interest rate
changes, in addition to objectives of policy. Traditional explanations given
in the literature for gradualism in monetary policy regard the concern of
the central bank in avoiding adverse reactions to frequent changes in inter-
est rates in the ￿nancial markets or reasons of reputation of the monetary
authority and uncertainty about the economy. Also, it has been argued by
some authors that interest rate smoothing increases the potency of mon-
etary policy, given the interaction of systematic monetary policy and the
forward-looking behaviour of agents. On the other hand, the interest rate
smoothing parameter has been estimated to be considerably large in several
countries, namely in the euro area (see for example Gerdesmeier and Roﬃa
(2003)).
Even though a policy rule as (22) may seem somewhat restrictive, such
simple rules have been found in the literature to be fairly robust to model un-
certainty (e.g. Levin, Wieland and Williams (1999) and Levin and Williams
(2003)), and in many cases close approximations of fully optimal rules. How-
ever, and as argued by Christiano and Gust (1999), the robustness of simple
Taylor rules across models may hinge on the source of rigidity considered
in the models, namely if one assumes that prices are sticky or if a ￿nancial
market friction is postulated.
3 Parameterisation
We set the parameters values in the model according to existing evidence
f o re u r oa r e ac o u n t r i e s .W ec o n s i d e rt w oequally sized countries that, apart
from the degree of price rigidity, are identical.
Consider ￿rst the preferences parameters. The discount rate is set to
give an annual steady-state interest rate of 3 per cent (around 1 per cent
quarterly). The risk aversion parameter γ is set to 1.5 which implies an
intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 0.7, following the Real Business
Cycle literature. This is broadly consistent with Smets and Wouters (2003)
14estimates for the euro area (but one has to bear in mind that their model
includes habit in consumption) and is close to the value estimated by Casares
(2001). Regarding the inverse elasticity of labour supply ψ, a wide range of
calibration values has been used in the literature. Micro-labour literature
estimates of the elasticity of substitution are relatively low while high labour
elasticities are usually used in dynamic general equilibrium models. We take
ψ equal to 1.5 and therefore an elasticity of labour supply of 0.7, which
falls between the values implied by macro and micro evidence. Finally, we
choose ψ0 such that households devote one quarter of their time to market
activities20, given the values chosen for the other parameters and the steady-
state of the model.
Regarding the technology parameters, we set the share of capital, α,t o
0.3. As for the inverse of the elasticity of substitution, σ,i ti ss e tt o6w h i c h
implies a steady-state net markup of 20 per cent. The stochastic processes
for the technology shocks (which in steady-state are set to 1) are assumed
to be autoregressive of order one with the persistence parameters set to 0.8.
Finally, regarding the innovation to the interest rate rule (22) (which is
also set to unity in steady-state) we assume that log( rt)=ρ r log( rt)+ert,
where ert has zero mean and ρ r is set to 0.5.
The parameter values are summarised in Table 1.
4 Equilibrium dynamics
We will now approximate the equilibrium dynamics of the model, for the
case of small enough disturbances, by considering a log-linear approximation
of the equilibrium conditions. First, we compute the steady-state and then
take a log-linear approximation of the equilibrium conditions around this
steady-state. All nominal variables are scaled by Mt
21. The linearised model
was solved using Christiano (2002) undetermined coeﬃcients method.
4.1 Steady-state
We now describe the deterministic steady-state around which the model
will be approximated. Shocks are set to their mean value. On the other
20We arrive at this value by taking the ten-year average of the employment rate in
the euro-area (in the period 1990-2000), aproximately 59.5 per cent, and considering an
average workweek of fourty hours.
21Given a variable Xt,w ed e n o t eb y e Xt its normalized value and by b e xt its log-deviation






15hand, nominal variables grow at the same constant rate. We consider a
zero in￿ation and zero money growth steady-state. Note that by assuming
in￿ation is zero in steady-state we are considering the steady-state where
there are no relative price distortions22.
Since in steady-state consumption is constant, the steady-state interest
rate in the monetary union is tied down by the consumers Euler equations
(13), so R = 1
β. On the other hand, equations (18a) and (18b) imply that
e p(a)=e PA and e p(b)=e PB. Using the loan market clearing and goods




⇔ e PjY j =1 .
From the demand functions (7) and (8) one can ￿nd the steady-state

















.G i v e n
that we assume N
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B then Y A = Y B and e PA = e PB = e P.















. From this and the consumers Euler equations one
concludes that C
A = C








Finally, taking the budget constraint and the cash-in-advance equation








Now we approximate the equilibrium conditions around the steady-state
described above.
22Actually, by assuming a zero in￿ation steady-state means that in steady-state all the
￿rms will update their prices in the same way every period.
16Given the utility function (1), the intertemporal conditions from the
consumers optimisation problem (13) are approximated by:
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[b rt − Et (nb πAt +( 1− n)b πBt)] (24)
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[b rt − Et (nb πAt +( 1− n)b πBt)]. (25)
since b πt = nb πAt +( 1− n)b πBt.
Similarly, log-linearising the intratemporal conditions (12), and taking
into consideration that b e pt = nb e pAt +( 1− n)b e pBt we get
ψb nA
t + γb cA
t = b wA
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By log-linearising the ￿rst order conditions of the ￿rms optimisation
problem one derives the aggregate supply equations:
b πAt = βEtb πAt+1 +
¡
1 − βθA¢ 1 − θA
θA
n
b rt + b e w
A





b πBt = βEtb πBt+1 +
¡
1 − βθB¢ 1 − θB
θB
n
b rt + b e w
B






















The monetary policy rule takes the following log-linear form
b rt = grb rt−1 +( 1− gr)(gπb πt + gyb yt)+b  rt (30)





=l o g(  rt).
23Given that we have no ￿nancial market friction (and since preferences are symmetric)
then consumption in country A will always equal consumption in country B and liquidity
in the monetary union will always be distributed proportionally to the size of each country
in the union.
24The exogenous shock  rt equals unity in steady-state.
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but since b pAt − b punw
At =0 25 and b pt = nb pAt +( 1− n) b pAt we get the
following clearing in the goods market conditions
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and e Db e dt = n e D
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5 The mechanics of the model
In this section we describe the main characteristics of the transmission mech-
anisms at work in the model. Beside describing the responses of the variables
in the model, we will also try to rationalise what is happening in the econ-
omy. However, one should stress that such reasoning entails a considerable
simpli￿cation because all the described events happen simultaneously, given
the general equilibrium nature of the model.
25The proof can be found for example in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2003).
18We assume that the two countries in the union are of the same size and
have an equal degree of price rigidity, and examine the responses of the
model economy to a common monetary policy shock, simultaneous technol-
ogy shocks, and country-speci￿c technology shocks. As regards the degree
of price stickiness, we consider two cases, namely that prices are unchanged
for slightly more than one quarter and for one year.
Since we assume only one type of friction, in the low price rigidity sce-
nario the model works closely to a basic cash-in-advance model where a
(persistent) monetary contraction is associated with a rise in output and
employment (Figure 1). This happens because in this case the in￿ation
eﬀect, acting as a tax on cash-goods, implies that a persistent monetary
contraction (by lowering anticipated in￿ation) has a positive eﬀect on out-
put and consequently on employment. In the case of a high degree of price
stickiness this is no longer true, a monetary contraction exhibits mainly de-
mand side eﬀects and therefore is associated with an output contraction and
a decline in prices. As for the interest rate it will follow the assumed rule,
namely reacting to in￿ation so to counter its behaviour according to
b rt =1 .5b πt +b  rt. (34)
In the ￿rst panel of Figure 1 we present the responses to a shock to the
monetary policy rule for the case where prices remain unchanged for roughly
one quarter. As regards the interest rate behaviour, even though we consider
ap o s i t i v es h o c kt ot h ei n t e r e s tr a t er u l e ,t h ei n t e r e s tr a t ea c t u a l l yf a l l sa s
the eﬀect from the systematic component of monetary policy, namely the
contemporaneous response to in￿ation, dominates the eﬀect of the random
component26. On the other hand, the innovation to the interest rate rule
means a contraction in the monetary aggregate27. An interest rate reduction
implies, other things equal, a decline in ￿rm￿s costs (current and future).
In this context, a signi￿cant downward adjustment of prices occurs and the
favourable in￿ation tax eﬀect explains the observed increase in consumption,
as consumers substitute consumption for leisure. Therefore employment and
output increase. On the other hand, the labour supply shifts up due to the
wealth eﬀe c ta n da tt h es a m et i m e￿rms increase their demand for labour,
which brings about an increase in real wages. Regarding the loan market,
there is an increase in deposits and a marked contraction of the monetary
26This result has been found elsewhere in the literature, as documented by Woodford
(2003).
27Therefore, the model does not predict in this scenario the existence of a liquidity
eﬀect.
19aggregate. Consequently the supply of loans declines slightly. At the same
time, there is a reduction in the demand for funds by ￿rms, who are faced
with a lower wage bill.
Even though the model does not exhibit a liquidity eﬀect in the low rigid-
ity case just described, this is not a necessary feature of our framework. In
a situation where prices are fairly ￿exible the in￿ation tax eﬀect dominates.
On the contrary, if the degree of stickiness is high, prices react less and the
real eﬀects are larger. Consequently the endogenous eﬀect on interest rates
no longer dominates the random component of policy and the interest rate
rises (second row of charts in Figure 1). Due to the monetary contraction,
consumption expenditures fall and given the sluggish response of prices real
consumption also decreases, unlike in the previous case. Lower consumption
entails a decline in output and lower employment. The increased willingness
of consumers to work jointly with the fall in the demand for labour by ￿rms
brings about a reduction in real wages28. Regarding the loan market, the
supply of funds declines, both through the fall in deposits and the monetary
aggregate contraction, which equals a lower demand for funds by ￿rms.
To gain further insight into the model we now analyse the responses to
technology shocks. First, consider the responses to a technology shock that
hits countries A and B at the same time, as displayed in the second panel of
Figure 1. A positive (and persistent) technology shock in both countries in-
duces a reduction of current and expected marginal costs, which leads ￿rms
to adjust prices downward and therefore induces a decline in the interest
rate. Even though all ￿rms face a decline in marginal costs (via both in-
creased productivity and lower interest rate) only a fraction adjusts prices.
As a result, the aggregate price level declines and consumption rises, but
less than proportionally to the increase in productivity. Therefore, ￿rms
may face demand by hiring less labour, since workers are more productive,
and aggregate employment falls. Since the adjustment in demand is weaker
the stickier prices are, then in the case of a low degree of price rigidity we
see employment increasing slightly, while for the case of a higher degree of
price stickiness we observe a signi￿cant contraction in employment29 (Fig-
28The model implies that after a monetary contraction we observe an increase in the
markup. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997) show that the actual behaviour of
prices is inconsistent with this implication of a sticky-price model of money. To solve this
failure one should dampen the change in marginal costs (e.g. introducing variable capital
utilisation) or adding other type of frictions, e.g. sticky wages or a ￿nancial market friction
as in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997) and Papadopoulou (2002).
29This result clearly contrasts with the predictions of standard real business cycle mod-
els, but is in line with ￿ndings in the literature for sticky prices models, namely Gal￿
(1999), Rotemberg (1996) and King and Wollman (1996).
20ure 1). Focusing on the labour market, the productivity shock leads to an
upward shift in the labour supply curve due to the increase in consumption
and shifts the labour demand curve up because workers are more productive
and labour is potentially less costly due to the decline in the interest rate,
thus pushing the real wage up. Nevertheless, the eﬀect on labour demand is
(partly) oﬀset by the fact that prices are sticky and therefore in equilibrium
prices and output will adjust less than they would under perfect price ￿ex-
ibility. Finally, given the increased demand for funds in the period of the
shock the monetary authority injects money in the economy.
Consider now an unanticipated positive productivity shock in country
A30 (third panel of Figure 1). The increase in productivity pushes down
marginal costs of ￿rms operating in country A (other things equal), putting
downward pressure on their prices. The observed decline in the aggregate
price level generates a reduction in the interest rate, which has a downward
eﬀect in marginal costs of ￿rms in both countries (other things the same).
On the other hand, consumption of both goods increases. Focusing ￿rst on
goods produced in A, the decline in marginal costs together with the in-
crease in demand implies that output rises while prices go down. Given
that workers in country A are more productive, the response of employment
depends on how strong the increase in output is compared with the increase
in productivity. An increase in the degree of price stickiness, by dampening
t h er e s p o n s eo fd e m a n dw i l lm a k ei tm o r el i k e l yf o re m p l o y m e n tt oe x p e -
rience a large contraction. The labour supply curve shifts up due to the
wealth eﬀect and the labour demand curve in A shifts up since workers are
more productive and the fall in the interest rate makes labour potentially
less costly, pushing the real wage up. However, the eﬀect on labour demand
is (partly) oﬀset by the fact that prices are sticky and therefore prices and
output will adjust less than they would under perfect price ￿exibility. As a
result while we see the real wage increasing in the low rigidity scenario, in
the high rigidity scenario the real wage in A temporarily falls. The move-
ment in relative prices therefore favours consumption of goods produced
in A, which consequently experience a stronger increase in demand and a
stronger output expansion than in country B. The rise in output in country
B necessarily implies that employment increases in this country. Given the
increased demand for labour and the lower willingness of consumer to work
associated with higher consumption, the real wage also increases in country
B. The change in demand (towards good A) together with the behaviour of
30For the sake of simplicity we assume that productivity shocks are uncorrelated across
countries and that there are no spillover eﬀects.
21the costs of ￿rms entails the temporary increase in prices of goods produced
in this country (not seen in country A).
6 Monetary policy with symmetric countries
So far we have assumed that the monetary authority only responds to in￿a-
tion developments. As a ￿rst step to assess the importance of the systematic
component of monetary policy in the union, we discuss the implications of
alternative rules of the form (30) for the dynamics of the model economy,
while maintaining the assumption of identical countries. In this case, as
countries are completely symmetric, i.e. there are no structural divergences
or diﬀerences in the transmission mechanisms of shocks, cross-country diﬀer-
entials only arise as a result of asymmetric shocks hitting the two countries.
Therefore, changing the design of the policy rule may have an impact on
the dynamics of each country but it will have no importance in explaining
the magnitude of diﬀerentials arising between the two economies. For illus-
trative purposes we consider an average duration of price contracts of two
quarters in each economy and study separately the eﬀects of changing the
degree of interest rate smoothing and the responsiveness of the central bank
to deviations of in￿ation and output from their steady-state values.
6.1 Impulse responses
First, consider the case of a stronger response to in￿ation developments by
the monetary authority. To make the comparison clearer we assume a con-
siderable increase in the response coeﬃcient, namely from 1.5, as in rule
(34), to 10.0 (￿rst and second rows of charts in Figure 2). Such an increase
of the coeﬃcient on in￿ation results in almost like having an in￿ation target
to be met period by period. Therefore, the central bank oﬀsets the eﬀect in
in￿ation of any shock and consequently the necessary adjustments will be
carried out with little response from in￿ation. If the monetary authority
is more responsive to in￿ation developments then it behaves cautiously by
trying to avoid surprising agents so that in￿ation does not ￿uctuate much.
Consequently, the eﬀects of a shock to the monetary policy rule are consid-
erably reduced.
When simultaneous technology shocks occur (Figure 3) and the mone-
tary authority behaves according to a rule like (34), the interest rate and
prices fall and demand increases, resulting in higher output (employment
hardly moves). If we increase the response to in￿a t i o ni nt h ep o l i c yr u l e ,
we again observe that in￿ation almost does not respond, which implies that
22the interest rate falls by considerably less. However, given that demand
expands slightly less than before, the fall in aggregate employment is some-
what higher. In face of country-speci￿c technology shocks (Figure 4) the
eﬀects are similar, namely in￿ation in the union is stabilized, the interest
rate response is smaller. To keep in￿ation close to target in the union, the
monetary authority prevents it from falling, which results in a greater in-
crease of prices of goods produced in A while prices of goods produced in B
do not fall by as much as they did, though the in￿ation diﬀerential remains
unchanged.
Alternatively, as argued in section 2.5, the central bank may want to
smooth the behaviour of the policy rate, which means that current deci-
sions explicitly depend on past decisions and therefore interest rate changes
are deliberately reduced. When the monetary authority conducts policy by
gradually adjusting the interest rate in response to deviations of in￿ation
from its steady-state value (third panel in Figures 2, 3 and 4), the interest
rate response on impact to any shock is less pronounced and the change
in the interest rate is relatively more persistent (in fact, even though in
the no-smoothing case, presented in the ￿rst panel, the interest rate reacts
more on impact, this response is reverted more quickly than in the case
with smoothing, presented in the third panel). In face of a monetary policy
s h o c k ,t h er e s p o n s eo fi n ￿ation and of the interest rate are less pronounced
t h a ni nt h ec a s ew i t h o u ts m o o t h i n g .A tt h es a m et i m e ,t h ed e c l i n eo fo u t p u t
and employment is somewhat accentuated by this change in the monetary
authority behaviour (given that the shock is more persistent, the favourable
in￿ation tax eﬀect is smaller). Similarly after a technology shock the in-
terest rate falls, but less than in the no-smoothing case and consequently
the in￿ation rate also shows a smaller decline. The increase in demand is
lower and the downward eﬀect in marginal costs via the interest rate decline
is also weaker, which reduces the demand for labour and consequently we
observe a larger contraction of employment.
Finally, one may postulate that the monetary authority besides respond-
i n gt oi n ￿ation developments, also adjusts the policy rate when output de-
viates from its steady-state value. Given that in face of a monetary policy
innovation there is no trade-oﬀ between stabilizing in￿ation and output, in-
creasing the response to output works in the same way as increasing the
response to in￿ation, and consequently both output and in￿ation decline
by less (Figure 2). The same is not true in face of technology shocks (Fig-
ures 3 and 4). With the ￿rst speci￿cation for the rule, following technology
shocks in￿ation goes down and output goes up. Therefore adding the output
term implies that the central bank tries to counter the output movement,
23which implies that output does not increase above its steady-state value by
as much as it does when the monetary authority responds only to in￿ation.
At the same, with an output coeﬃcient in the policy rule, in￿ation shows a
stronger decline.
6.2 Unconditional second moments
Besides looking at impulse response functions to evaluate the impact of
changing the systematic component of monetary policy, one can also look
at the unconditional second moments of relevant variables, which combines
the information of having all sh o c k sa tw o r ka tt h es a m et i m e 31.T a b l e 2
presents measures of the volatility and correlation of relevant variables under
several monetary policy rules.
In accordance with the results presented above, when we increase the
response of the monetary authority to in￿ation developments, the variability
of in￿ation and output decreases and the interest rate is also less volatile.
On the other hand, by adding (or increasing) the interest rate smoothing
coeﬃcient, most variables present a less volatile behaviour. In contrast,
adding a response to output increases the variability of both output and
in￿ation32.
As argued by Dotsey (1999a, b) and Gavin and Kydland (1999), the
systematic component of monetary policy may have signi￿cant implications
for the correlations in a model. In our model economy, output and in￿ation
are negatively correlated, which is associated with the economy￿s behaviour
in face of technology shocks. On the other hand increasing the response to
in￿ation in the union implies that the cross-country correlation of output is
reduced. As for the correlation of goods price in￿ation across countries, for
al o wc o e ﬃcient on in￿ation the correlation is positive but turns negative for
higher values and gets stronger the higher the response to in￿ation in the
case of a rule without smoothing. In the case of a rule with smoothing, this
correlation is always negative under the rules considered, and it is also con-
siderably strong for high values of the coeﬃcient on in￿ation. In fact when
the central bank is very responsive to in￿ation developments in the union,
price in￿ation of goods A and B are almost perfectly negatively correlated,
since for stabilizing in￿ation in the union, in￿ation of one good oﬀsets in-
31The statistics were obtained by running Monte Carlo simulations. The results are
therefore conditional on the assumed distribution of shocks.
32This fact results from the response of the economy to technology shocks. In fact,
as seen above, the variability of in￿ation and output conditional on monetary shocks is
reduced when the monetary authority also responds to output developments.
24￿ation developments of the other good. Adding an output response has the
opposite eﬀect on output correlation namely it increases the comovement
between output in the two countries (while making it more volatile) and
increases the comovement of in￿ation of goods A and B.
7 Monetary policy with asymmetric countries
In a monetary union where the central bank has an area-wide perspective,
country-level analyses are justi￿ed, among other reasons, by potential dif-
ferences that may exist in the transmission mechanism of shocks owing to
diﬀerences in economic and ￿nancial structures. Such diﬀerences imply that
even in the presence of common shocks disparities will emerge among coun-
tries in the union. This is illustrated, for example, by AndrØs, Ortega and
VallØs (2003) for the case of cross-country diﬀerences in the degree of com-
petition in the goods market, in the degree of price inertia and in the degree
of openness (or preference for foreign goods in consumption)33. The authors
￿nd that small diﬀerences in the degree of competition generate consider-
able in￿ation diﬀerentials (at business cycle frequency) among countries in
a monetary union facing a common monetary policy shock. Additionally,
they ￿nd that cross-country asymmetries in the degree of nominal inertia
and openness also contribute to generate substantial in￿ation diﬀerentials
in presence of regional shocks. Figure 5 illustrates how the relative degree
of price inertia in￿uences the in￿ation diﬀerentials generated by shocks in
our model in the impact period of each shock34. Our results show that the
existence of asymmetries in the degree of price inertia generates sizeable
diﬀerentials in face of monetary and technology shocks, which are more sig-
ni￿cant in the case of country speci￿c technology shocks, thus supporting
the conclusions of the above mentioned work.
These results involve an assumption regarding the characterization of
monetary policy. We assumed that the monetary authority sets the interest
rate to prevent deviations of in￿ation from its steady-state value, ensuring
that the interest rate moves smoothly35. But the speci￿cation of the mone-
tary policy rule also matters for the results obtained, and consequently it is
33Another example is Duarte and Wollman (2003) who analyse the volatility of in￿ation
diﬀerentials in a monetary union under asymmetric ￿scal and productivity shocks.
34AndrØs, Ortega and VallØs (2003) ￿nd that, when shocks are common, the relative
degree of market competition is quantitavely more important in generating in￿ation dif-
ferentials than relative price inertia.
35We assumed that b rt =0 .7b rt−1 +1 .5b πt +b  rt. The authors also assumed a rule with
smoothing and an in￿ation response, though with a somewhat diﬀerent parameterisation.
25important to understand the asymmetries observed across countries in the
union. In the previous section we assumed that countries were identical and
consequently asymmetries only existed in the presence of country-speci￿c
shocks. In contrast, when structural diﬀerences exist among countries, com-
mon shocks also propagate diﬀerently across countries and even though the
monetary authority only looks at aggregate variables, the speci￿cc h o i c eo f
how to conduct policy will potentially be important to shape each country
response to shocks, either common or country-speci￿c.
In this section we study the importance of systematic monetary policy
on the transmission of shocks in a monetary union when countries exhibit
diﬀerent degrees of price inertia, thereby extending the analysis in AndrØs,
Ortega and VallØs (2003) (even though our model is in some dimensions
simpler than their model). In particular, we assume that in country A prices
remain unchanged for slightly more than one quarter while in country B
prices are ￿xed for one year. To do that we analyse how the model works
under four alternative policy rules, namely
Rule 1) b rt =1 .5b πt +b  rt (35)
Rule 2) b rt =0 .7b rt−1 +1 .5b πt +b  rt (36)
Rule 3) b rt =0 .7b rt−1 +1 .5b πt +0 .5b yt +b  rt (37)
Rule 4) b rt =0 .7b rt−1 +1 .5b πt +1 .5b yt +b  rt. (38)
The choice of rules is aimed at covering a set of diﬀerent ways a central
bank can react to economic developments, by changing the relative impor-
tance assigned by the central bank to deviations of in￿ation and output from
their steady-state values, and are not necessarily based on the results from
the estimation of reaction functions for any particular economy in a given
period. While rule 1 and 2 postulate that the monetary authority only wor-
ries about in￿ation developments, rules 3 and 4 hypothesize that the central
bank responds both to in￿ation and output, in the spirit of the rule pro-
posed by Taylor (1993). However, we consider the existence of smoothing in
interest rates, which did not happen in Taylor￿s proposal, since it has been
shown to be an important characteristic of central bank behaviour.
We focus on the responses of output and in￿ation to simultaneous and
country-speci￿c shocks and will concentrate on the short-run diﬀerences
across countries. Additionally, we look at a number of statistics regarding
the volatility and the comovement of relevant variables in the model.
267.1 Impulse responses
Figures 6 to 9 show the responses of output and in￿ation to a monetary pol-
icy shock, simultaneous technology shocks and country-speci￿c technology
shocks under each of the rules considered. Table 3 summarises information
on the magnitude of the responses of output and in￿ation, in the period of
the shock and four quarters after. The dynamics of output and in￿ation in
t h eu n i o na n di ne a c hc o u n t r yd i ﬀer somewhat when the reaction function of
the monetary authority is changed. Unlike in the previous section, common
shocks also generate cross-country diﬀerentials, due to the asymmetry in
price inertia. In addition, the behaviour of the central bank plays a role in
the cross-country diﬀerentials that arise following a shock. Table 4 reports
cross-country diﬀerentials of output and in￿ation under the diﬀerent rules
considered. One should stress that the diﬀerentials generated on the impact
period usually vanish rather quickly because there are no strong propaga-
tion mechanisms in the model36. Consequently, our analysis of cross-country
diﬀerentials will focus on the short-run.
In Figure 6 we present the responses of output and in￿a t i o nt oas h o c kt o
the interest rate rule when the central bank follows each of the rules under
consideration (equations (35) to (38)). Given the observed contraction in the
monetary aggregate, both in￿ation and output in the union go down. Prices
of the goods produced in country A fall by more because the degree of price
stickiness is lower in this country, thereby generating on impact a negative
in￿ation diﬀerential between good A and good B. Then in￿ation gradually
returns to its steady-state level, but since price adjustment is quicker in the
country where prices are more ￿exible, we then observe a positive diﬀerential
for some periods. On the other hand, since prices are quite ￿exible in country
A we get little real eﬀects from a monetary policy shock in this country,
whereas in country B output falls considerably. The responses of output
and in￿ation to a shock to the interest rate rule are qualitatively similar
across the rules under consideration. However, given that the reaction of
output in country B is reduced either by adding smoothing or an output
response to the ￿rst rule, and since the real eﬀects in country A are basically
inexistent, then this rule generates higher output diﬀerentials than the other
three rules. Additionally, the in￿ation diﬀerentials are also higher when the
36We could however increase the persistence of such diﬀerentials by moving to a Phillips
curve in the spirit of the hybrid New-Keynesian Phillips curve, as in Gal￿ and Gertler
(1999) and Gal￿, Gertler and L￿pez-Salido (2001). We could also strengthen the propa-
gation of shocks following Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2003), by introducing a
dynamic updating scheme in the Calvo formulation or by improving the real side features
of our model, namely with the introduction of variable capital utilisation.
27central bank only looks at in￿ation (rule 1) than when it also responds to
output (rules 3 and 4).
The responses to simultaneous technology shocks are presented in Figure
7. When a technology shock hits both countries at the same time, there is a
downward pressure on prices of both goods, given lower marginal costs. But
the fraction of ￿rms adjusting prices is smaller in country B thus the relative
price movement favours consumption of good A. Consequently, even though
we see demand for both goods rising, the increase in output of good A is
stronger and consequently we observe a positive output diﬀerential between
A and B. If the central bank aims at stabilizing not only in￿ation but also
output (relative to their steady-state values) we observe greater diﬀerences
between the output response of the two countries, because output in the
country where prices are more ￿exible partly compensates for the changes
in output of the other country which leads to the desired stabilization of
output in the union. At the same time, adding a response to output also
widens the in￿ation diﬀerentials.
When the technology shock is country-speci￿c the results are consider-
ably diﬀerent if the shock hits the country where prices are more ￿exible,
country A, or the country where prices are stickier, country B. If the shock
hits the country where prices are more ￿exible (Figure 8), the eﬀect on
costs will imply a considerable downward adjustment of the price of good
A. Given that the relative price of good A falls, demand for this good in-
creases by more than that for good B and consequently a positive diﬀerential
between the responses of output in A and B arises. If the central bank re-
sponds strongly to output movements in the union, production of good B
may actually fall, since the considerable change in relative prices induces
consumers to strongly substitute consumption away from good B. This im-
plies a somewhat smaller response of aggregate output and a widening of
the output diﬀerential. On the other hand, adding a response to output also
increases short-run in￿ation diﬀerentials between goods A and B. Moreover,
if the central bank prefers interest rates to move smoothly then we observe
a narrowing of both output and in￿ation diﬀerentials.
Consider now that the shock hits the sticky price country, i.e., country
B (Figure 9). The downward pressure on prices associated with a shock to
technology induces a smaller reaction of prices in the country hit by the
shock than in the previous case. Given that the fraction of ￿rms that adjust
prices in each period in country B is smaller than in A, the pressure on
prices associated with the shock induces a smaller reaction of price in￿ation
of good B. On the other hand, output in this country and in the union
increases and only slowly returns to the steady-state level, while output
28in country A barely moves because in this country most of the necessary
adjustment is done through prices. The dynamics of output and in￿ation
are also somewhat altered when we change the monetary authority reaction
function, as seen in Figure 9. The rule with stronger response to output
induces a more pronounced response of in￿ation in the union and price
in￿ation of both goods fall considerably more, with the fall in in￿ation of
good B being induced by behaviour of the central bank. On the other hand,
and in contrast with the case of a technology shock to country A, increasing
the response by the central bank to output generates lower output and
in￿ation diﬀerentials across countries. A rule with smoothing again implies
lower diﬀerentials between countries, both output and goods price in￿ation.
7.2 Unconditional second moments
The results based on impulse response functions can be complemented with
statistics that summarise the behaviour of variables in the model under
alternative rules, as shown in Table 4. In this section, we concentrate our
attention on the implications of alternative rules on the volatility of in￿ation
and output.
According to the results presented in Table 4 and Figure 10, the intro-
duction of smoothing in the reaction function of the central bank, namely
going from rule 1 to rule 2, stabilizes in￿ation and, to a less extent, output,
both in the union and in each country. Additionally, it implies, as seen in the
previous section, lower short-run diﬀerentials between countries. However,
the positive correlation between the rates of in￿ation of goods A and B is
considerably reduced37. On the other hand, if the central bank reacts to out-
put developments besides reacting to in￿ation, as in rules 3 and 4 compared
with rule 2, we observe that while aggregate output is less volatile this comes
at the cost of increased in￿ation volatility in the union. Additionally, while
the volatility of output in the stickier country is reduced when the policy
rule reacts to output, we observe an increase in the volatility of output in
country A compared with output in the stickier country. On the contrary,
the volatility of good A in￿ation relative to good B decreases, as the rise
in standard-deviation of the in￿ation rate is more pronounced in the goods
produced in the stickier country. Adding an output response also implies
as i g n i ￿cant change of the correlation of variables across countries (Table
4). Indeed, the stronger the response to output in the union the less output
37Our results seem to be in line with those of Gavin and Kydland (1999) in that changes
in the policy rules have greater implications in the magnitude of the correlation of nominal
variables than real variables.
29in the two countries will move together. For a suﬃciently high response to
output developments in the union, production in the two countries actually
becomes negatively correlated.
In sum, in aggregate terms the policy that provides the greater stabi-
lization for in￿ation is not the same that is best for stabilizing output at
its steady-state level, a result akin to those in Woodford (2003). On the
other hand, a central bank that ensures interest rates move smoothly in
general lowers in￿ation and output diﬀerentials between countries. In ad-
dition, a rule that improves the results in terms of the aggregate variables
volatility does not necessarily imply the same for country-speci￿cv a r i a b l e s .
Also, the behaviour of the central bank in￿uences the diﬀerentials arising
between countries, and the rule that implies smaller diﬀerentials depends on
the shock that hits the union. Finally, the comovement of variables in our
model also depends to a considerable extent on the behaviour of the central
bank.
The implications of systematic monetary policy in shaping the responses
of a model economy to shock are used by Dotsey (1999b) to argue that the
results in the literature that attempt to discriminate across models based on
correlations or impulse responses are not robust. Using a model similar to
that in Gal￿ (1999), the author shows that following technology shocks one
may obtain either a positive or a negative correlation between output and
in￿ation or between output and employment depending on the monetary
policy rule assumed38. In keeping with his suggestion, we also concluded
that in our model the comovement of variables depends on the reaction of
the central bank to economic developments. As regards the labour market,
Figure 7 shows the responses of labour and the real wage to simultaneous
technology shocks. The inspection of the impulse responses makes clear that
the adjustment in the labour market also hinges on the speci￿cation of policy.
Speci￿cally, a common positive technology shock can either entail a quite
muted response of employment in both countries or imply a pronounced
contraction of employment in country B accompanied by a slight increase in
employment in country A, depending on the assumed monetary policy rule.
38In a previous paper, Judd and Trehan (1995) also called attention to the fact that
cross-correlations may not be very informative to discriminate among models. The authors
show that the signs of correlations between variables, namely prices and output, depend
crucially on the model used and therefore provide little information about the shock driving
an economy.
308C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
In this paper we investigated the importance of systematic monetary policy
for the dynamics of a two-country currency union where agents are asym-
metric in the degree of nominal rigidity. We thereby extend previous contri-
butions to a monetary union framework. In particular, we focus on a single
rigidity, namely price stickiness, and work with a simple model to keep the
analysis straightforward. The main conclusion of our work is that the de-
sign of monetary policy matters for the dynamics of the union not only in
aggregate terms but also in terms of the behaviour of individual countries
and it plays an important role when explaining diﬀerences arising between
countries in a union. Even though we have assumed that the mandate of
the central bank is to focus on developments at the union￿s level, a policy
implication of our analysis would be that it is important for the central
bank to acknowledge how his actions will in￿uence national developments.
Speci￿cally, the monetary authority actions may rebalance how the eﬀects
of a shock are distributed in the union and may compel a greater adjustment
burden on the agents in some countries relative to others.
Our analysis is broadly in line with previous results in the literature.
In particular, we conclude that the policy that provides greater in￿ation
stabilization is not the same that also stabilizes output at its steady-state
level, as Woodford (2003) pointed out in a slightly diﬀerent framework.
In this paper we take a positive focus and address questions regarding the
design of alternative monetary policy rules, which is motivated by the recent
attention given to the diﬀerences in economic behaviour amid countries in
the EMU. Nevertheless, a natural extension of our work would be to study
optimal policy in a monetary union framework, a topic that has already
been analysed by Benigno (2003) in a similar framework.
Even though we expect that, to some extent, the robustness of our key
conclusions do not hinge crucially on our modeling choices, some speci￿c
results will depend on the model used. Therefore, an additional step in the
analysis will lead us to investigate the robustness of the results, for example,
to the introduction of other frictions in the model or of factor mobility
(through the inclusion of physical capital with elastic supply) which would
improve the reallocation of resources among countries in the union. Most
importantly, this would also bring our model closer to the data and would
also allow us to take more direct implications for policy makers.
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Discount rate β (1.03)
-1/4
Risk aversion γ 1.5
Elasticity of labour supply 1/ψ 0.7
Share of capital α 0.3
Elasticity of substitution 1/σ 1/6
Persistence of shocks
    Technology  ρ
j 0.8
    Interest rate rule ρ r 0.5
Parameter
Table 1: Parameterisation
yy Ay B ππππ ππππ A ππππ B ry A , y Bππππ A,ππππ By , ππππ yA,ππππ Ay B , ππππ Br , ππππ
r(t)=1.5π ( t ) 1 . 1 11 . 4 81 . 4 80 . 7 10 . 8 70 . 8 60 . 7 50 . 1 30 . 3 3 - 0 . 6 2 - 0 . 4 8 - 0 . 4 80 . 8 5
r(t)=4.5π (t) 1.07 1.45 1.44 0.16 0.52 0.52 0.39 0.09 -0.80 -0.51 -0.28 -0.29 0.63
r(t)=10.0π (t) 1.06 1.44 1.44 0.07 0.50 0.50 0.35 0.09 -0.96 -0.49 -0.22 -0.22 0.55
r(t)=0.7r(t-1)+1.5π (t) 1.03 1.42 1.42 0.44 0.66 0.66 0.33 0.06 -0.13 -0.12 -0.19 -0.19 0.47
r(t)=0.7r(t-1)+4.5π (t) 1.05 1.43 1.43 0.14 0.52 0.52 0.31 0.07 -0.82 -0.20 -0.21 -0.21 0.33
r(t)=0.7r(t-1)+10.0π (t) 1.05 1.44 1.43 0.06 0.50 0.50 0.31 0.08 -0.97 -0.22 -0.20 -0.20 0.28
r(t)=0.4r(t-1)+1.5π (t) 1.05 1.44 1.43 0.49 0.70 0.70 0.43 0.08 -0.02 -0.30 -0.28 -0.28 0.62
r(t)=0.9r(t-1)+1.5π (t) 1.02 1.42 1.41 0.42 0.65 0.65 0.28 0.05 -0.17 -0.03 -0.15 -0.15 0.38
r(t)=0.7r(t-1)+1.5π ( t ) + 0 . 5 y ( t ) 1 . 0 51 . 4 31 . 4 30 . 6 70 . 8 40 . 8 30 . 6 20 . 0 70 . 2 8 - 0 . 7 2 - 0 . 5 3 - 0 . 5 30 . 8 4
r(t)=0.7r(t-1)+1.5π ( t ) + 1 . 5 y ( t ) 1 . 1 01 . 4 71 . 4 71 . 5 51 . 6 31 . 6 21 . 3 10 . 1 20 . 8 0 - 0 . 9 3 - 0 . 7 1 - 0 . 7 10 . 9 6
r(t)=1.5π ( t ) + 1 . 0 y ( t ) 1 . 3 11 . 6 41 . 6 32 . 4 72 . 5 32 . 5 22 . 3 50 . 2 80 . 9 2 - 0 . 9 7 - 0 . 7 9 - 0 . 7 90 . 9 9
r(t)=1.5π ( t ) + 1 . 5 y ( t ) 1 . 4 41 . 7 51 . 7 43 . 7 33 . 7 73 . 7 73 . 4 00 . 3 70 . 9 6 - 0 . 9 9 - 0 . 8 3 - 0 . 8 31 . 0 0
Standard-Deviation Cross-correlations

































Rule 1 0.01 0.00 -0.28 -0.09 1.03 0.53 0.88 0.39 1.02 0.52 0.36 -0.08 0.01 0.01 0.52 0.47
Rule 2 -0.01 0.00 -0.26 -0.08 0.92 0.49 0.80 0.46 0.93 0.50 0.33 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.47 0.47
Rule 3 -0.01 0.00 -0.23 -0.07 0.96 0.52 0.66 0.39 0.94 0.52 0.21 -0.06 0.01 0.00 0.45 0.44

































Rule 1 -0.58 0.00 -0.29 -0.06 -0.51 -0.19 -0.36 -0.21 -0.74 -0.05 -0.08 -0.15 0.23 -0.14 -0.28 -0.06
Rule 2 -0.51 -0.01 -0.26 -0.06 -0.22 -0.01 -0.10 -0.02 -0.47 0.04 0.13 -0.04 0.25 -0.05 -0.23 0.02
Rule 3 -0.45 0.00 -0.22 -0.05 -0.73 -0.16 -0.43 -0.20 -0.81 -0.03 -0.08 -0.13 0.08 -0.13 -0.35 -0.06
Rule 4 -0.34 0.00 -0.17 -0.03 -1.61 -0.42 -1.00 -0.50 -1.36 -0.15 -0.41 -0.29 -0.25 -0.27 -0.59 -0.22
Table 3: Asymmetric countries - Impulse responses
Impulse responses - Output
Monetary policy shock Simultaneous technology shocks Technology shock in country A Technology shock in country B
Country A Country B Country A Country B
%            
dev. from 
steady- state
Impulse responses - Inflation
Monetary policy shock Simultaneous technology shocks Technology shock in country A Technology shock in country B
Country A Country B Country A Country B
%            
dev. from 
steady- state






























Rule 1 28.5 9.5 -28.5 6.7 14.7 13.3 -14.7 2.4 65.8 59.7 -65.8 10.8 -51.1 -46.3 51.1 -8.4
Rule 2 25.3 8.6 -25.3 5.1 11.9 2.4 -11.9 1.7 59.7 50.6 -59.7 8.2 -47.8 -48.2 47.8 -6.4
Rule 3 22.4 7.2 -22.4 4.6 29.9 13.5 -29.9 4.2 73.4 57.5 -73.4 10.4 -43.4 -44.0 43.4 -6.3
Rule 4 17.6 5.1 -17.6 3.6 60.9 33.1 -60.9 8.5 95.1 68.5 -95.1 14.0 -34.1 -35.4 34.1 -5.5
yy A y B
stdev(yA)   
/          
stdev(yB) ππππ ππππ A ππππ B
stdev(ππππ A)   
/          
stdev(ππππ B) nA nB
stdev(nA)   
/          
stdev(nB) yA,yB ππππ A,ππππ By , ππππ yA,ππππ Ay B , ππππ B
Rule 1 1.10 1.62 1.31 1.23 0.72 1.06 0.60 1.76 0.05 1.10 0.04 0.12 0.45 -0.61 -0.61 -0.18
Rule 2 1.07 1.53 1.25 1.22 0.45 0.76 0.44 1.72 0.12 1.12 0.11 0.18 0.06 -0.11 -0.31 0.12
Rule 3 1.01 1.57 1.16 1.35 0.65 0.98 0.58 1.71 0.09 1.06 0.08 0.07 0.36 -0.69 -0.59 -0.35






yA-yB ππππ A-ππππ B
Technology shock A
yA-yB ππππ A-ππππ B
Table 4: Asymmetric countries - Differentials and statistical moments
Simultaneous technology shocks
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rt xt (rhs)Note: Theta A is kept unchanged at 0.25.
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Rule 2